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REBROADCASTRIGHTS
By Harlan R. Schreiber
orty years ago, television programs offered a simpler view of the
world. Ward taught Wally and the Beaver lessons of life, and Ralph
and Alice Kramden were a relatively happy couple. All was well with the world.
Indeed, the television industry itself was similarly uncomplicated. Networks gave
programs to affiliates who in turn gave viewers access to the programs. Much like
the more complicated family lives of today, however, the relationship between the
networks and affiliates is no longer as simple and familiar as it was in the 1950s.
Due to technological changes, their once-symbiotic relationship now has turned into
an ongoing war. The networks' battle plan is to minimize affiliates' role in provid-
ing network programming. Their first salvo has been an attempt to
The reach viewers via cable in addition to their over-the-air
Com ing broadcasts. The affiliates, in turn, have
Battle in the tried vigilantly to preserve their
War Between the traditional role as the
Networks and the Affiliates networks'
principal programming dissemina-
tor. The latest battle in this war
takes place on the minefield of net-
work cable rebroadcasts of prime-
time programs.
In March 1997, MSNBC, an NBC
cable television station, began re-air-
ing Dateline NBC, one of NBC's
prime time programs. This cable
rebroadcast strained the relations
between NBC and its affiliates. The
affiliates maintain that the re-airing
of the Dateline NBC and other pro-
gramming violates the exclusivity
clauses that they have been granted
by NBC for prime time program-
ming. Indeed, the controversy over
the exclusive right to broadcast net-
work programming is not limited to
NBC. ABC, CBS, and FOX all have
entered into the cable market, and
their affiliates have expressed simi-
lar concerns over the how cable net-
works might infringe on the viewer-
ship of local affiliates.
The network-affiliate dispute did
not begin with rebroadcasting.
Rather, it is only the newest growing
pain in the evolving television indus-
try. As cable has entered American
homes, the networks have begun to
examine alternative methods of dis-
tribution, which would minimize the
affiliates' role in providing program-
ming to viewers. The resulting clash
will establish each side's role and
bargaining power in defining future
industry changes. Because this ten-
sion ultimately will be resolved in
negotiation, it is important that the
parties guard their rights and exercise
all the bargaining power now available.
This Note will analyze the present
rebroadcast dispute, examining the
legal and practical issues that will
arise and recommend how the par-
ties should proceed in the controver-
sy. The analysis will place this con-
troversy within the larger context of
how networks and affiliates are
attempting to redefine their roles in
the television industry.
The first section will address the
history of networks and affiliates and
how their relationships have
changed as technology has advanced.
The second section will then place
the present controversy regarding
cable rebroadcasts within the frame-
work of the larger industry. It will
also address how the present contro-
versy could be resolved in negotia-
tion, litigation, or settlement. The
third and fourth sections will exam-
ine respectively the viability of the
parties' legal claims and remedies.
Finally, this Note will draw conclu-
sions based on the direction the tele-
vision industry is moving and how
such trends affect the parties' strate-
gy in the present controversy.
TIES OF TRADITION:
NETWORKS AND AFFILIATES
The three major television net-
works are NBC, CBS, and ABC.' All
three operate similarly, supplying
programming with the goal of provid-
ing their products to the most possi-
ble viewers. A large audience will
encourage sponsors to invest in the
network's programming. In order to
disseminate its product to as many
viewers as possible, the networks
contract with local affiliates, which
broadcast the programs to specific
regions. The local stations, in turn,
need programming to fill their sched-
ules, which the networks supply.
In a typical network-affiliate
agreement, the network provides the
affiliate with a schedule of programs
and commercials, compensating the
affiliate for the airtime it allocates.
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The affiliate may run the programs
as it chooses, subject to contractual
guarantees. If the affiliate chooses
not to air a particular show, however,
another station in the market may
gain access to it. 3 If the affiliate does
air the network's program, the net-
work pays a fee based primarily upon
the strength of the specific affiliate
and the size of the market. 4 The pay-
ment comprises a small amount of a
large affiliate's revenues but can
make up to 30 percent of a smaller
affiliate's revenue. 5 In return for the
programs and fees from the net-
works, the affiliate retains only a
limited amount of local airtime.
Each of the major networks has
approximately 200 affiliates nation-
wide. In order to guarantee airtime,
the networks own the affiliates in a
few of the major markets, such as
New York and Los Angeles. The
majority of affiliates are independent
stations that have established rela-
tionships with their network since as
early as the 1950s. Affiliates rarely
change the network with which they
have contracted 6-although this has
changed somewhat in the last ten
years with the emergence of new net-
works, such as FOX, WB, and UPN.
These new networks have provided
affiliates with alternatives in con-
tract negotiations, but they have not
significantly altered the senior net-
works' affiliate rosters because their
programming is not popular enough
to prompt audience shifts. Since the
affiliates have little other recourse,
their bargaining power against the
networks is limited.
Traditionally, network-affiliate
agreements lasted an average of two
years. This changed in 1994 when
some CBS affiliates defected to FOX
because the National Football
League transferred its broadcasting
rights from CBS to FOX. 7 The affili-
ates profited from the flexibility
inherent in short-term contracts, as
they were able to shift networks to
access desired sporting events and
other valuable programming. CBS,
meanwhile, was left to scramble for
new affiliates. In an effort to combat
this affiliate freedom, networks have
changed their affiliate agreements to
run generally from five to ten years.
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CABLE INVASION
In the days of The Honeymooners,
the networks were the only source of
programming. By the 1980s, howev-
er, cable television emerged as a
major competitor for viewers. 9 Cable
television's strength in diverting
viewers from network television
rests in its ability to offer many sin-
gle-themed channels. While a net-
work offers news, movies,
sports, sitcoms, and dramas, L
most cable channels focus
on only certain content.10 A
ESPN is solely dedicated to
sports, for example, CNN to
news, and HBO to movies.
Provided viewers are inter-
ested in their themes, cable
channels are guaranteed a
favorable market share in
their given niche because




lost a significant number of viewers
and a parallel amount of advertising
revenue as a result of cable televi-
sion. Network television's prime
time ratings share has dropped
steadily from 93 percent in 1977 to
61 percent in 1996.11 Correspond-
ingly, the percentage of total televi-
sion advertising revenues spent on
network television also has dropped,
from 60 percent in 1979 to 30 percent
in 1997.12 In an effort to recapture
this lost market share, networks
have entered the cable television
business. The networks began by
purchasing previously existing cable
channels. ABC, for example, has
purchased ESPN, Lifetime, and A &
E. Generally, networks have not
used their formidable name recogni-
tion or programming to boost their
cable channels' ratings. As always,
viewers were drawn to these cable
channels for their single-themed pro-
gramming, not because the viewer
might identify the cable channel with
the network that owns it.
THE TELEVISION
INDUSTRY EVOLVES
In response to the growth of cable,
the networks have tried to redefine
their traditional position. In 1992,
NBC made the first network endeav-
or to reshape network-affiliate roles.
NBC owned the right to broadcast
the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in
Barcelona, Spain. Instead of offering
the traditional range of events to its
affiliates, NBC launched a "triple-
cast." For the triple-cast, NBC aired
some events on its affiliates and cre-
ated three pay-per-view cable chan-
nels to air uninterrupted coverage
from 5 a.m. to 5 p.m. 13 Though the
affiliates were given the same quan-
tity of coverage as in years past, NBC
reserved some of its most attractive
events, like basketball, for the triple-
cast in an attempt to lure sub-
scribers. 14 The affiliates were out-
raged by the triple-cast, fearing that
their audience would be diluted by
viewers splitting their loyalty
between the affiliate and the cable
stations. 15  Furthermore, the net-
work signal disseminated by the
affiliates contained advertisements
for the triple-cast, thus forcing the
affiliates to promote a product against
which they were competing. The affil-
iates' fears about the triple-cast were
not realized, as the triple-cast was not
well received by viewers-it lost $100
million. 16 Still, the triple-cast was
significant because it represented the
first network offensive to
diminish the affiliates'
involvement in disseminat-
ing programs to viewers.
Indeed, networks have only
expanded their campaign on
the cable market since the
failure of the triple-cast.
Recently, the networks
have created their own
cable stations that bear
their names and logos. In
1992, NBC bought the FNN
channel, which it converted
to CNBC. Since its incep-
tion, CNBC has been used
simply to provide public information,
much like C-SPAN. In 1996, howev-
er, NBC launched MSNBC and CBS
created CBS Eye on People, both of
which were designed to supplement
the existing network channels.
1 7
The networks use their name recog-
nition and extensive resources to pro-
mote these cable channels, sharing
recognized anchorpersons and
reporters across the channels. Dave
Keneipp, Vice President of Legal
Affairs for FOX Television, com-
ments that "[NBC news personali-
ties] cross over all the time. Jane
Pauley has Dateline and [Tom]
Brokaw hops over."
1 8
These network cable channels are
primarily, but not entirely, news-
themed channels. They are a
response to the current trend of view-
ers flocking to news-themed stations
when news breaks. 19 In fact, net-
work nightly news viewership has
dropped 22 percent in the last five
years while cable news channels'
viewership has risen.20 This phe-
nomenon may occur for two reasons.
First, the viewers can be assured
of immediate coverage on the cable
channel because news is that chan-
nel's primary goal. Second, the cable
channel may occupy such a strong
niche as a news provider that view-
ers now reflexively tune into the sta-
tion for all their news. Cable news
channels have enjoyed much higher
ratings than the networks when cov-
ering breaking news stories such as
the chase of O.J. Simpson, the death
of Princess Diana, and the Monica
Lewinsky scandal. 2 1  This trend
spurred the networks to enter the
cable news fray. Michelle Dube,
Programming Director of WKRN in
Nashville, Tennessee, notes that
"broadcasters lose viewers to cable
every year, [so entering] cable allows
them to recapture viewers."
2 2
Although these network cable
channels are available for news 24
hours a day, they generally do not
provide reporting around the clock.
CNBC and MSNBC have offered talk
shows such as Rivera Live as well as
a video-recorded rebroadcast of the
Don Imus Radio Show. NBC has
also used the cable channels to
rebroadcast some network program-
ming, including reruns of Late
Night with Conan O'Brien and
Dateline NBC.2 3 To date, there
have been few network cable
rebroadcasts, so affiliate ratings
have not yet markedly suffered.
"WHAT IS GOOD FOR
THE NETWORK IS GOOD
FOR THE AFFILIATES"
Currently, rebroadcasts are limit-
ed mostly to news magazines, as net-
works attempt to regain their lost
market share of the news. MSNBC's
recent excursion into rebroadcasting
late-night programming, however,
may mark a significant change in the
use of network cable channels
because entertainment programming
has held stronger with network view-
ers. Network cable channels may
shift their focus from supplementing
the networks' low-rating news cover-
age to instead focusing on the
dependable entertainment shows
that are the lifeblood of the affiliates.
Indeed, NBC may have manifested
this intent when it began rebroad-
casting Late Night with Conan
O'Brien. If network cable channels
engage in widespread rebroadcasting
of entertainment shows, it will sig-
nificantly change broadcast televi-
sion by redefining the roles of net-
works and affiliates.
While networks and affiliates
have long worked together to reach
as many viewers as possible, the end
result of a network venture into
entertainment rebroadcasting could
create a network conglomerate of
multiple, independent channels. The
purpose of this arrangement would
be to capture as many viewers as
possible for the overall entity. The
distribution of viewers within the
conglomerate would not matter to
the network, which would target only
the aggregate viewership of all its
channels. In such a framework, the
affiliates' specific viewership could
diminish greatly or disappear entire-
ly. Discussing whether network
cable rebroadcasts posed a threat to
affiliates, Michael Gartner, former
president of NBC, maintains that
"network cable allows NBC to get
more viewers and that is good for the
network. ... What is good for the net-
work is good for the affiliates." 2 4
But this is not always the case.
Despite assertions by the net-
works to the contrary, network and
affiliate interests diverge on the
issue of rebroadcasting. Rebroad-
casting, like the triple-cast and net-
work cable, represents another step
towards phasing affiliates out of the
television industry. While the elimi-
nation of affiliates may not be immi-
nent, rebroadcasting is a first step in
that direction because it demon-
strates that viewers may be drawn to
cable instead of the affiliates. In
response to networks' motivations for
rebroadcasting, Jim Waterbury, for-
mer president of NBC's network-
affiliate relations board and General
Manager of KWWL in Waterloo,
Iowa, notes that "networks are
always trying to find ways to change
their partnership status with their
affiliates." 2 5 It is this attitude that
pervades the issue of cable rebroad-
casting. While triple-cast was a fail-
ure, rebroadcasting on cable net-
works may not be.2 6
INDUSTRY WEAKNESS,
BARGAINING STRENGTH
In order to resolve the issue of
cable rebroadcasts, the affiliates
must specifically delineate their com-
plaints. The affiliates protest that
rebroadcasts of network programs
will erode their viewership because
viewers will no longer rely on them
for network programming. 27 While
rebroadcasts have been isolated
enough that no significant erosion
has yet occurred, the affiliates should
not wait until rebroadcasts become
an industry standard. Some affili-
ates are particularly bothered by the
cable rebroadcasts because they
interpret their affiliate agreements
to grant them exclusive rights to the
network programming within their
broadcast areas.
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The outcome of this dispute will be
affected largely by the network's rel-
ative strength of bargaining position.
Jim Waterbury states that "[the net-
work] owns more affiliates now and
now has greater leverage on the affil-
iates [in negotiations]. ' ' 29 Network
executives agree with this position as
well. Dave Keneipp of FOX points
out, "There is not a lot of negotiating
leverage on the part of the affiliates.
... The affiliates can do little to
change their situation."30 This point
is further supported by FOX's net-
work-affiliate form contract, which
makes no mention of affiliate exclu-
sivity.3 1 The form agreement demon-
strates the strength that networks
hold over the affiliates in bargaining.
But the affiliates are not without
bargaining power. Industry execu-
tives are quick to note that the net-
work still needs affiliates to reach
the largest possible television audi-
ence. Dave Keneipp notes that no
broadcast medium can "reach 100
percent of the country the way the
over-the-air television does." 32 Jim
Waterbury further explains that
"there are only a limited number of
VHF stations in the country, and
they are the only free [non-cable] tel-
evision stations in the country."33 In
addition to the limited number of
broadcast televisions stations,
Keneipp says, "The highest cable
penetration in any market in the
country is still no greater than about
low 70, maybe 75 percent. ... That's
still 25 percent of the audience [with
no viewing alternative but broadcast
television]."'3 4 The affiliates' status
as the only television providers in
certain markets gives them enough
leverage to conduct meaningful nego-
tiations with the network. However,
network television loses more and
more viewers to cable each year.
This loss of viewership, as cable
expands into more rural markets,
continually undercuts the affiliates'
status in bargaining. The affiliates
need to assert more than their ever-
dwindling status as broadcast televi-
sion stations to negotiate effectively
with the network.
The affiliates also have the
recourse of preempting network pro-
gramming in order to protest the net-
work's behavior. 3 5  This strategy
would hurt the network because it
would lose patches of viewers to
other networks when the affiliates
cancelled their programs. However,
the preemption strategy is not advis-
able because the affiliates would
weaken themselves in the process.
Preemption would place the network
in the uncomfortable position of los-
ing viewers, but the affiliates would
also be harmed by their decreased
audience. Furthermore, the affili-
ates cannot preempt as a group
because that strategy may constitute
an antitrust violation. 36 Even if the
affiliates decided on a station-by-sta-
tion basis to preempt, they are still
at risk because, arguably, their
actions could still amount to a collu-
sive effort to control dissemination of
network programming. Thus, the
risks involved in punitive preemp-
tion outweigh any benefit.
ARGUMENTS AND REMEDIES
The affiliates seek to prevent the
rebroadcasting of network program-
ming on cable because they fear an
erosion of viewership and a loss of
advertising revenue. Kenneth
Elkins, Chairman of NBC Affiliates
and a member of Pulitzer Broadcas-
ting, describes this tension when he
"see [s] MSNBC as being a competitor
[to affiliates]."'3 7  Gary Chapman,
President of NBC affiliate LIN
Television, criticizes rebroadcasting
because it causes networks to "canni-
baliz[e] [their affiliates and, as a
result, the affiliates] have the biggest
audience defection [to cable networks]. '"38
Whether through negotiation or
litigation, the affiliates' first priority
is to stop network rebroadcasting.
The networks may offer to pay off the
affiliates to continue this practice,
but financial inducements will not
offset the long-term losses that affili-
ates will experience as a result of
viewer dilution. If the negotiations
fail, the affiliates may be forced to
threaten litigation. If so, they will
marshal three arguments. First, the
cable rebroadcasts violate the exclu-
sivity clauses of the network-affiliate
contracts. Second, rebroadcasting
breaches the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Finally,
the affiliates may argue that the net-
work's actions violate the Cable Act
of 1992 ("Cable Act" or "the Act"),
which prohibits cable rebroadcast of
network programming without con-
sent of the affiliates.
The networks can counter each
claim. First, the exclusivity clauses
may be too broad to apply in the pres-
ent controversy. Second, the net-
work can deny that the rebroadcasts
demonstrably harm the affiliates,
and, in the absence of injury, no
implied covenant has been breached.
Finally, the network will contend that
the rebroadcast restrictions of the
Cable Act do not apply because
Congress did not anticipate this specif-
ic controversy in enacting that legislation.
THE LONG SHADOW
OF LITIGATION
There are two viable alternatives
for the affiliates: accept a cash settle-
ment or attempt to obtain some
rebroadcast protection from the net-
work. Regardless of whether the
parties are in negotiation or in litiga-
tion, the same legal issues will per-
vade the debate because the affiliates
may need the threat of litigation to
loom over negotiations if the affiliates
are to procure a favorable settlement.
Network-affiliate disputes often
are settled through negotiations. In
this dispute, the network might offer
the affiliates a cash settlement to
assuage their fears of lost revenue.
This would not be in the long-term
interests of the affiliates because it
does not solve the affiliates' exclusiv-
ity problem, as exclusivity is the life-
blood of affiliates. Discussing exclu-
sivity in the context of program
duplication in KCST-TV v. FCC, the
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia noted that, without exclu-
sive rights to programs, "a [broad-
cast] station's audience would be
diluted ... which would diminish the
station's advertising revenues and
which might threaten the quality of
the station's programming or the
very survival of the station."
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Accepting cash and addressing
future network-affiliate issues as
they arise is not in the affiliates' best
interests. Instead, they should mobi-
lize and insist on protection from the
network to assure that at least their
immediate future is secure. Such a
resolution, however, may require lit-
igation as leverage.
Affiliates and networks rarely liti-
gate. As former NBC President
Michael Gartner notes, "I doubt any
litigation will occur [between the net-
works and the affiliates]. ... Nobody
usually goes to court in these situa-
tions because the stakes are too
high. '4 0 Jim Waterbury of KWWL in
Waterloo, Iowa is more open to the
possibility of litigation but adds that
even though "litigation is not impos-
sible ... it is a long way down the road."
4 1
Though the affiliates' role in the
broadcasting industry is not strong
enough to obtain a favorable settle-
ment up front from the networks, lit-
igation or its threat may tip the
scales. If the affiliates' case is ini-
tially successful, it could induce the
networks to concede more than pay-
ments to the affiliates. The threat of
litigation itself places pressure on
the networks because bad publicity
flowing from a lawsuit endangers
goodwill with viewers and advertis-
ers. Indeed, as Waterbury observes,
"The networks fear bad press and
bad publicity even more than the
actual results of litigation."42  A
threat of litigation could help the
affiliates bargain for limited rebroad-
casting in the future.
The new, longer affiliate agree-
ments also encourage litigation. If
the agreements only ran two years,
an injunction would be impractical;
the contract likely would have
expired by the time the issue was
adjudicated. But the new, longer
affiliation agreements first arose in
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1995, just before the creation of mod-
ern network cable in 1996. Thus,
these agreements still have signifi-
cant life, which could make pursuit
of an injunction a worthwhile goal.
Still, the prospect of long and bitter
litigation against a business partner
may be against the best interests of
the affiliates, despite their long-term
agreements.
The networks, however, also have
an incentive to litigate, at least to a
preliminary stage. In fact, the net-
work may be best served by initiat-
ing the suit. The affiliates could
bring a number of different suits in
different jurisdictions, which
would be difficult and costly
to defend. The network
could sue in New York or
California, depending upon
where it is headquartered, I
seeking a declaratory judg-_ BF
ment against all its affili-
ates. This preemptive move
would consolidate the suit
and place it in a court that
might be more sympathetic
to large commercial organi-
zations. Consolidation
would make prosecution of the suit
more efficient. Moreover, such a pro-
active stroke would reassure net-
work stockholders, who would be
alarmed by a highly-publicized rash
of suits by individual affiliates across
the country.
While litigation will probably not
be played out to its fruition, it will
affect the bargaining power of the
parties during negotiations. The
parties' relative bargaining power
will be tied to the strengths and
weakness of their respective legal
positions. The affiliates cannot
threaten litigation effectively if their
legal claims have no basis. As such,
the viability of the legal contentions
of the affiliates must be examined, as
they are vital to bargaining position
and power.
The Exclusivity Clause
The affiliates' first legal argument
is based on the network-affiliate con-
tract clause that provides the affili-
ates with exclusive rights to network
programming within their broadcast
areas. The rebroadcast of network pro-
grams on network cable arguably
infringes this exclusive contractual right.
Although network-affiliate con-
tracts are not uniform, their exclu-
sivity clauses can generally be classi-
fied into two categories. 4 3 The first
type of exclusivity clause is limited to
a right of first refusal on all network
programs offered for the affiliate's
broadcast area. This right grants an
affiliate the ability to be the first tel-
evision station within a broadcast
area to air the network's programs.
Such a clause, on its own, is probably
not enough to demonstrate an intent
by the parties to prevent network
programs from being rerun on net-
work cable stations. It merely pro-
vides that the affiliate has the first
opportunity to air a program; it does
not prevent others from later airing
the same program within the affili-
ate's broadcast area. This advantage
is distinctly different from the ability
to restrict programming output.
Thus, the right of first refusal does
not necessarily include the right to
exclusive programming. Therefore,
affiliates with such an exclusivity
clause would not be able to argue
breach by rebroadcasts.
The second category of exclusivity
clauses is the kind typically granted
by networks. 4 4  This exclusivity
clause is general in its terms, provid-
ing that the affiliate will have exclu-
sivity in network programming in
the affiliate's broadcast area. It
makes no mention of network cable
rebroadcasts. In order to determine
whether this type of clause can be
invoked in this dispute, the
intent of the parties at for-
mation of the contract must
Rbe examined.
As noted above, many ofILL lthe affiliates have been
Lassociated with their net-
works for 40 or 50 years,
with periodic contract
renewals. 4 5  Over the
years, the exclusivity
clause has always granted
protection to affiliates with-
in their broadcast area.
However, when the clause was first
drafted, there was no threat of cable
stations encroaching on the affiliates'
viewership, and certainly no threat
that the networks would enter the
cable field. The issue then is
whether the affiliates must specifi-
cally point to protection for today's
situation or whether a general clause
of exclusivity is sufficient to protect
the affiliates against all broadcasts
of network programming.
It can be argued that history is no
guide in interpreting the exclusivity
clause. Since the parties have regu-
larly renewed the contracts, the
meaning of the exclusivity clause has
changed as new issues are raised in
subsequent negotiations. Since the
most recent exclusivity clauses do
not mention protection from network
cable, it could be argued that such
silence is deliberate and that the par-
ties elected not to address the cable
issue in their bargaining.
For this latter argument to be per-
suasive, an affiliate must have been
aware of the network's competing
cable station at the time of renewal.
If on notice, the affiliate must protect
itself when its interests could be
infringed. In a majority of the cases,
however, the affiliate's exclusivity
clause has predated the network's
cable stations. In such cases, the
affiliate could hardly protect itself
against an eventuality that it could
not reasonably foresee.
While the exclusivity clauses of
the 1990s or even the 1980s are not
exactly the same as those granted in
the 1950s, the concept of protection
of programming still pervades the
clauses. Thus, the underlying inter-
ests of the affiliates still remain the
same-the affiliates seek insulation
from influences that might weaken
their programming. This overriding
interest is still applicable. If this
general exclusivity clause protects
the affiliate from rebroadcast by
other channels, the same provision
should apply equally to a network-
authorized third party and to the
network itself. The fact that the net-
work may own rights to the pro-
grams themselves does not change
the exclusivity issue. Rebroadcasts,
whether they are aired by the net-
work's cable stations or by a local
competitor, equally injure the affiliate.
The general exclusivity clause
should defeat rebroadcasting by the
network cable stations as long as the
affiliate negotiated for such protec-
tion while unaware of competition
from the network cable channels like
MSNBC. In future network-affiliate
negotiations, however, affiliates will
have at least constructive knowledge
of this phenomenon and therefore
must require specific protection from
the network. The network might
then select its affiliates based on
whether they are willing to forego
such protection.
However, this potential develop-
ment does not defuse the threat that
litigation poses to the network. In
this case, an injunction could be cost-
ly to the network. Any programming
interruption would put the network
behind its competitors in reaching
viewers. The prospect of five to ten
years' delay in developing a cable
presence is threat enough to make
the network respect any litigation that
has a chance of winning on the merits.
The Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The common law of most states
recognizes that "every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its per-
formance and its enforcement.
'4 6
Good faith requires that the parties
to a contract not undertake actions
that, although not expressly forbid-
den by the contract, either effectively
frustrate the purpose of the contract
or destroy or materially impair the
benefits of a contract. 4 7 The covenant
must be shown to be "implicit in the
agreement ... as a whole."4 8
Good faith arises out of equitable
principles that require a showing
that the parties' behavior, while not
in breach, emasculates the very pur-
pose for creating the contract and
therefore warrants judicial interven-
tion.4 9 The threshold for enforcing
the implied covenant is quite high.
The harm must be sufficient to oblit-
erate the reason for making the con-
tract and it "could not have been con-
templated at the time of drafting."
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The affiliates likely can invoke the
implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in two ways. First, the
existence of network cable broadcast
channels was not foreseeable at the
time that affiliate agreements were
negotiated. Second, the resultant
harm of rebroadcasting would effec-
tively sabotage affiliate viewership
to such an extent that it threatens
the affiliates' very viability.
The implied covenant protects
only against risks that could not
have been contemplated when the
contract was signed.5 1  Thus, the
affiliates must establish that they
could not reasonably have anticipat-
ed that the networks would rebroad-
cast their programs on network
cable. This contention is supported
by the fact that network cable did not
exist with its present goals when
many of the affiliate agreements
were signed. CNBC was in existence
at the time these contracts were adopt-
ed, but its programming style diverges
significantly from the journalistic
content of the broadcast networks.
The networks have long been
involved in cable, purchasing previ-
ously existing cable channels. This
prior involvement arguably placed
the affiliates on notice that network
cable was the next logical step in a
developing industry. In truth, how-
ever, the networks themselves did
not realize that rebroadcasts might
be advantageous to their cable chan-
nels for many years. 5 2 Therefore,
networks cannot convincingly argue
that the affiliates have been on notice
of an industry development when the
networks themselves entertained no
such plans of expansion until recent-
ly. Thus, the affiliates would satisfy
the non-foreseeability requirement of
the implied covenant.
The second requirement of the
implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is that enforcement of
the contract, in light of the unfore-
seeable event, would injure the affili-
ates to such an extent as to defeat
the purpose of the contract. 53 Here,
the affiliates need to demonstrate
that they will suffer a dramatic loss
in viewership, which would not have
occurred had the parties addressed the
cable issue in their contract negotiations.
The extent of future viewership
loss is difficult to prove because what
draws viewers to certain shows and
how to interpret viewership trends
are speculative inquiries. 54  Even
those in the field can merely delin-
eate patterns in viewership but can-
not precisely attribute the trends to
any specific cause or event.
James G. Webster, Professor of
Communica-tions Arts at the
University of Maryland, bore out the
speculative nature of the endeavor in
his study of audience duplication.
Webster found that there is "no spe-
cial tendency for viewers of one pro-
gram to watch another of the same
type.... All readily observable [view-
ership] patterns seem to be predicted
by scheduling characteristics
alone."5 5 Thus, it is difficult to prove
how many viewers the affiliates might
lose as a result of rebroadcasts.
The issue then becomes whether
the likelihood of such loss consti-
tutes sufficient harm to meet the
standard that the implied covenant
would require.
United Video, Inc. v. FCC
addressed the issue of the likelihood
of harm resulting from loss of pro-
gramming exclusivity.5 6 In the case,
cable television companies chal-
lenged the FCC's syndicated exclu-
sivity rule. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia found that,
while assessing injury caused by
nonsimultaneous duplication of tele-
vision shows is "novel and complex,"
the practice harmed the original
source of programming. 5 7 The court
reasoned that the practice of nonsi-
multaneous duplication of a program
was injurious because "cable compa-
nies themselves regularly take
advantage of their ability to obtain
exclusive rights in programming."
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United Video was not grounded in
a statistical study. Instead, the court
reasoned that since all parties desire
exclusivity, it must have value. But
the fact that all parties desire exclu-
sively does not dictate that exclusivity
is necessarily vital to solid ratings. It
is conceivable that stations desire exclu-
sivity because it might protect them and
not because it conclusively protects
their shows. Thus, United Video might
not control the network-affiliate dis-
pute because the basis of its conclu-
sion could be questioned empirically.
However, the affiliates probably
will prevail on the United Video
rationale because its findings are
supported elsewhere. Other cases
also have recognized that "without
[exclusivity], serious financial prob-
lems ... would befall local television
stations."5 9  In re Blytheville TV
Cable, an FCC agency hearing, also
accepted this premise despite the
absence of statistical studies. 60 In
both cases, the FCC filed reports con-
cluding that lack of exclusivity
injured television stations. 6 1
There is still a chance that a net-
work could present statistical evi-
dence that United Video,
Blytheville, and the FCC were in
error. This is not likely to occur
because, to date, no such evidence has
been offered in a case or study to
contradict these judicial conclusions.
Thus, the findings of these courts
indicate a willingness to accept that
loss of exclusivity will cause harm
sufficient to meet the requirement of
the implied covenant.
The Cable Act of 1992
All affiliates, whether or not pro-
tected by their exclusivity clause,
may be able to invoke the Cable Act
of 1992 to enjoin the networks from
cable rebroadcasts. Section 325(b) of
the Act contains a provision that pre-
vents cable systems from retransmis-
sion of broadcast television signals
without the express authority of the
originating station. 62 The affiliates
could argue that the §325(b) of the
Cable Act supports their case
because network cable rebroadcasts
constitute retransmission on a cable
system without consent. The Act
does prevent rebroadcast of network
programming on cable and, in a gen-
eral sense, this describes the conduct
of the network cable station. But the
substance of the Act does not support
the affiliates' argument.
First, §325(b) does not prohibit the
networks but rather "cable systems"
from retransmitting a broadcast tele-
vision signal. The affiliates here are
suing the network and its cable chan-
nel, not the cable systems that carry
the channel. But this problem can be
avoided by suing the cable systems
themselves. For convenience, this
discussion will only refer to the net-
works as the defendants in this sec-
tion but it should be understood that
the cable systems would be joined.
The more formidable textual
problem for the affiliates to over-
come is whether the cable system is
actually "retransmitting" the broad-
cast channel's "signal." Here, the
complaint is that the network cable
channels rebroadcast shows that
have already been seen on the affili-
ates' stations. The network cable
channel does not rebroadcast the
affiliates' actual signals, however,
but rather the programming that
was once on that signal. As such, the
network's actions are most likely out-
side the scope of §325(b).
Even though the text does not sup-
port the affiliates, the intent of the
Act may. Through the Cable Act,
Congress sought to prevent cable
systems from using their monopolis-
tic status to unfairly treat customers
and television stations. 6 3 The Act
explicitly stated that it intended to
protect customers from unfair rates
and to prevent the systems from con-
trolling what television channels
could carry. 64 Accordingly, the Act
mandated retransmission consent.
Congress found that most viewers
subscribed to cable because of the
availability of broadcast network tel-
evision. 65 The Act created retrans-
mission consent so that the cable sys-
tems could not retransmit as a "free
rider," thereby benefiting




contains no mention of this
particular type of network-
affiliate dispute. The Act
was passed in 1992 and
modern network cable did
not begin until 1996.
Furthermore, the Act can-
not be cited by analogy. Nowhere
does it distinguish the interests of
the network and from those of its
affiliates. The closest the Act comes
to recognizing separate rights in
broadcast signals is found in its leg-
islative history. In the hearings of
the House Subcom-mitte on
Telecommunications and Finance,
the President of the National
Association of Broadcasters, Edward
Fritts, noted that "there are two
interests intertwined in a broadcast
signal-the interest in the signal
which belongs to the broadcaster,
and the interest in the programs car-
ried on that signal which belongs to
various copyright holders."6 6  This
statement still does not separate clear-
ly the broadcast rights of affiliates
from those of the networks.
Such a divergence of interests is
the essence of the present dispute,
and its absence in the Act strongly
suggests that the statute does not
apply to this case. Because the Act
does not specifically or implicitly
anticipate the present controversy,
nor even recognize the possibility
that the network and its affiliates do
not share the same interests, the
Cable Act cannot be invoked to pre-
vent network cable rebroadcasts.
Injunctive Relief and Sufficient Harm
The affiliates have a reasonable
likelihood of success on their claims
of exclusivity and the implied
covenant of good faith. Although the
litigation may not reach the point of
imposing a remedy, it is still neces-
sary to consider the probability that
the affiliates can obtain an injunc-
tion. The affiliates will draw no bar-
gaining power from the threat of litiga-
tion unless they could obtain an injunc-
tion as a result of their claims.
Otherwise, the network has no reason
to fear litigation.
Analysis of injunction is difficult
in this case. Not only does it require
speculation to a future point in the
litigation, but this issue presents a
novel and complex controversy that
has never been addressed by a court.
However, the injunction is more
valuable as a bargaining chip in
negotiation than as a satisfactory
resolution in court. Accordingly, the
likelihood of an injunction matters
more than its scope. If in the course
of the litigation, the network con-
cludes that the affiliates have a rea-
sonable chance at obtaining an injunc-
tion, it will be more inclined to negotiate.
Under California and New York
law, the likely jurisdictions of such
disputes, injunctive relief is granted
where a party proves "a likelihood of
substantial and immediate irrepara-
ble injury" and the "party's legal
remedies are inadequate."6 7 In addi-
tion, the court "balances the conven-
iences of the parties and possible
injuries to them according as
they may be affected by the
injunction."68  The court
must also "pay particular
regard for the public conse-
quences in employing the
T extraordinary remedy of
injunction."6 9
Injunctive relief is appro-
priate when a party will suf-
fer irreparable harm.
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Injunctions are granted only
upon proof that damages are inade-
quate. 71 This analysis of sufficient
harm is the same as under the
implied covenant. On one hand,
Blvtheville, United Video, and the
FCC all found that loss of exclusivity
will damage affiliates. On the other
hand, these findings are not neces-
sarily conclusive because they lacked
statistical grounding. However,
United Video and the FCC conclu-
sions would raise a significant possi-
bility that a court would grant an
injunction to the affiliates. This
possibility is reason enough for the
affiliates to threaten litigation dur-
ing negotiations.
Another factor to be weighed in
granting an injunction is the burden
on the enjoined party.72 Again, since
harm has yet to occur, it is difficult to
balance injury between the parties.
But, as recognized in United Video,
In re Blytheville, and the FCC's find-
ings, the affiliates could be severely
harmed by the rebroadcasts.
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Conversely, since the network
rebroadcasts have been isolated until
now, it is difficult to argue that they
have become integral parts of net-
work cable programming. Thus, the
affiliates have a viable argument that
the balance of harm is in their favor.
Public Policy Implications
Public policy may be considered in
deciding whether or not to grant an
injunction. 74 Home Box Office, Inc.
v. FCC dealt with public policy impli-
cations involved in television exclu-
sive rights cases. 75 In that case, a
cable company sought review of FCC
limits on programming fares for pay
cable channels. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized that "as a matter of policy
further restrictions should not be
placed on the [cable television]
industry."7 6 The court's rationale for
this policy was that restrictions on
cable programming were "contrary to
the public interest" because they did
not "promote diversity of programs
and sources" on cable television.
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In accordance with this policy, the
networks could argue that restricting
its cable output will reduce program
diversity on cable.
However, this argument is not
likely to succeed because it frames
programming solely in the context of
cable television. It is true that the
rebroadcasting does add new shows
to cable television. However, in the
scheme of television as a whole, the
programs do not truly increase diver-
sity because the rebroadcasted shows
are already available, for free, on the
affiliates' stations. In fact, public
policy would dictate that network
cable has an obligation to offer pro-
gramming that is truly diverse, not
merely rerun what is already available
to viewers. Thus, public policy would
probably favor granting an injunction.
It is only necessary at this point to
inquire whether the affiliates have a
remedy that will make their threat of
litigation potent. In the case of
rebroadcasts, quantifying harm,
assessing damages, and balancing
injury are all difficult when harm
has not occurred and the issue is new
to the industry. However, the affili-
ates only need to demonstrate that
their chance of winning in court
makes negotiating out of court
worthwhile for the networks. The
possibility of injunction in this case
will encourage the networks to settle.
Additionally, when the networks'
risk of losing in court is combined
with the negative publicity that liti-
gation will generate, the networks
have great incentive to settle the con-
troversy and concede meaningful
protection to the affiliates.
Despite the fact that the affiliates
might succeed at trial, any victory
would maintain the status quo only
until their old agreements expire. At
that time, the networks would rene-
gotiate for the right to rebroadcast
through their own cable stations. If,
on the contrary, the affiliates settled
early to receive some protection from
network-owned cable rebroadcasts,
such protection could become part of
the canon of affiliate agreements.
This negotiated protection could set
the terms for the future and allow
the affiliates to redefine themselves
at least as primary, as opposed to
sole, providers of network program-
ming. Even if technology proves that
affiliates have become obsolete in an
era of viewer-tailored content, the




Despite the possible precedent of
the Cable Act, Congress is unlikely to
step in to resolve this dispute. Any
intervention would be premised on
the assumption that weak affiliates
result in more programs on cable,
thus restricting the range of pro-
grams for a significant number of
viewers. Dave Keneipp, FOX Vice
President of Legal Affairs, notes that
if popular events such as the Super
Bowl were aired on cable, "Congress
would have something to say
[because its airing outside of broad-
cast cable makes it] inaccessible to
35 percent of the country."78 Indeed,
Congress might act on the grounds
that preventing a large number of
viewers from watching a diversity of
programming is against public policy.
However, Congressional action is
premature at this point. Neither the
Super Bowl nor any other nationally
significant programming has been
aired outside of broadcast television.
Furthermore, for 50 years, networks
and affiliates have been able to nego-
tiate sufficiently fair agreements
through all the changes in the mar-
ketplace. Absent proof otherwise,
there is no reason to think that they
will not be able to negotiate in the
future. Even if the affiliates are in
an inferior bargaining position,
Congress may not deem them a party
worth protecting. Indeed, if the affil-
iates are, in fact, destined for extinc-
tion like eight-track tapes and
Betamax players, there would be no
public interest in granting them
Congressional protection.
Experts remain divided on the
question of whether affiliates will be
necessary to the process of spreading
network shows to the public in the
future. Michelle Dube of WKRN
states that networks will utilize
cable over affiliates "within five
years-if not sooner."' 79 In contrast,
in their article on the future of tele-
vision, professors of communication
James R. Walker of Saint Xavier
University and Douglas A. Ferguson
of Bowling Green State University,
write that "it is difficult to see a near
future without. ... broadcast televi-
sion. ... [T]he wide coverage and low
direct costs to consumers make it too
attractive [to viewers]." 8 0 However,
even Walker and Ferguson concede
that "[broadcast television] will
never return to the secure, insular
competition of its first generation.
8 1
It seems that the question is not
whether broadcast television will be
eclipsed by cable television, but
rather when and to what extent.
Dave Keneipp predicts that "over-
the-air [affiliates may] just become
another version of cable in the sense
of specialty channels. '8 2  Jim
1 The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) defines "networks" as companies that
provide programming to fill prime-time hours
for all seven days of the week. FOX, the
fourth largest programming provider, does
not meet provide sufficient programming to
be subject to FCC regulations. HOWARD J.
BLUMENTHAL & OLIVER R. GOODENOUGH, THIS
BUSINESS OF TELEVISION 21 (Margaret Sobel,
ed., Billboard Books 1998).
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